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Public Policy and
Entrepreneurship
Douglas Holtz-Eakin
Introduction
The image of the American entrepreneur retains an enduring
fascination in the minds of the public and policy makers alike. For
example, testifying several years ago at a congressional hearing on
“the entrepreneurial spirit in America,” Wisconsin's Senator Robert Kasten
said of entrepreneurs: “They create new jobs. They provide new
competition to existing businesses. They help to improve product quality,
help to reduce prices, add new goods and services never before
thought of, advance new technologies, America's competitive
stance.”  His statement captures the view that entrepreneurial1
enterprises are valuable sources of technological advance, jobs, and
dynamism, a trait commonly attributed to small business as a whole.
Our national affection toward entrepreneurs also manifests itself in
attitudes towards small business. “Start-up,” “family,” and other small-
scale businesses carry an important weight in discussions of national
policy. This durable affection stems in part from the perception that
small business is the vehicle by which entrepreneurs provide needed
vigor to the economy.
In the newly established democracies of Eastern Europe a widely
discussed challenge is the need to regenerate a vital entrepreneurial
sector. The centralized regime pushed the mass production paradigm to
its limit, at times concentrating the entire production of a good in a
single factory. The dismal record of poor quality products and stagnant
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economic growth highlights the need for the competition and vigor
provided by start-up enterprises.
The national focus on small business is not merely talk. Many
government policies are directed toward aiding small businesses. For
example, fulfilling a Clinton campaign promise, the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (RRA93) permits the exclusion of 50 percent of
capital gains on qualifying investments in start-ups and small businesses
held for five or more years.2
This Brief surveys the various notions of “small business,” presents criteria
that should underlie policies toward business, and reviews the case for
public policies to stimulate entrepreneurship and small business. It
concludes that it is surprisingly difficult to construct a case in favor of
systematically favoring small businesses. Indeed, it is probably not useful
to think of creating a “small business climate” through policies like
targeted tax breaks, wage subsidies, loan guarantees or outright grants.
Instead, policies should be devoted to developing an environment
favorable to innovation, employment, and growth in the economy as a
whole. 
Who Are the Entrepreneurs?
Entrepreneurs are usually characterized by their daring, risk-taking,
animal spirits, and so forth. Economist Joseph Schumpeter, whose work
highlighted the power of entrepreneurial forces, chose these words:
To act with confidence beyond the range of familiar beacons and
to overcome that [social] resistance requires aptitudes that are
present in only a small fraction of the population and that define
the entrepreneurial type... (Schumpeter 1942).
Unfortunately, the design and implementation of public policy requires
less literary, more prosaic criteria to identify entrepreneurs. A bit of
introspection suggests that this is likely to be a difficult task. Some
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entrepreneurs never start out as small businessmen. It is easy to
imagine— indeed many could even name— a highly entrepreneurial
individual whose efforts were contained within a large corporation,
directed toward not-for-profit activities, or otherwise expended far from
the solo businessman/small business frontier. While clearly the first step is
to identify an entrepreneur, the difficulty in doing so represents a major
argument against trying to direct policy toward entrepreneurs.
What is a “Small” Business?
Let us accept for the moment the notion that for entrepreneurial
reasons it is useful to develop policies to aid small firms. What, exactly, is
a small business? That is, how does one draw the line separating small
firms from large firms? Historically, there have been at least three
defining characteristics:
The first and perhaps most obvious is revenues, sales or other
output-based measures. A firm crosses the line from “small” to
“large” when its production or profit reaches becomes sufficiently
large. We can think of firms as small or large just as we think of
individuals as poor or rich. The graduated structure of the corporation
income tax implicitly endorses this way of framing the issue: a “small”
firm has less than $50,000 in taxable profit; medium-sized firms lie in
the range of $50,000 to $75,000; and large firms exceed $75,000 in
profits. As it turns out, the tendency to think of firms in the same terms
as people, while tempting, leads to considerable difficulties. I return
to this notion in what follows.
A second obvious candidate is the number of employees. The
popular image of a “mom and pop” operation centers on a business
with few employees. More recently, the political and popular
fascination with job creation (particularly “good job” creation) has
made it common to divide employers on the basis of the number of
jobs. Within the policy sphere, the Office of Advocacy, Small Business
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Administration, frequently uses this employment criterion to identify
small businesses.
Finally, one could use asset accumulation as the measure of “size.”
For example, the capital gains tax preference introduced in RRA93 is
limited to firms with $50 million or less in assets.
This hardly exhausts the possibilities. For example, in the case of
subchapter S-corporations (corporations that benefit from limited
liability, but are taxed like partnerships), the measure of “size” is the
number of shareholders.3
The definition clearly matters, as firms are configured differently on the
basis of income, employment, and assets. Consider two equally
profitable businesses, one in the oil extraction business, the other in
management consulting. The former will likely have much greater assets
and lower employment, other things equal, than the latter. Which is the
small business? And do we wish to set policies to favor one over the
other?
Are Small Businesses Entrepreneurial or Just Small?
This question is central to the issue of preferential treatment, or even to
deciding which definition of “small” is most useful. And it is ultimately an
empirical issue as well; there is no substitute for extensive evidence
regarding the correlation between measures of firm size and the
propensity to innovate, improve, and market products.
The research literature to date, however, has not provided a clear
resolution to this question. In part, the question has been avoided; the
entrepreneurial virtues of new businesses are often assumed rather than
examined. Also, as the discussion above has highlighted, there is no
clear method and set of criteria for evaluating the contribution of small
business per se to productivity growth in the economy.
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In the absence of a strong case based on facts, one must turn instead
to principles. What principles should guide public policies toward
entrepreneurs?
Public Policy Principles
It is standard to evaluate economic policy using a two-pronged test:
economic efficiency and equity or fairness. How do these guidelines
help us to formulate small business policies?
Economic Efficiency
Economic efficiency means organizing the broad array of production
activities— the products produced; the amount of each product; the
firms engaged in production; the use of employees, equipment, and
structures in the production process; and so forth— to meet the desires of
the population while using as few resources as possible. The central
insight of Adam Smith’s celebrated “Invisible Hand” is that profit-
oriented production for market leads to economic efficiency. Firms
have a built-in incentive to use as few resources as possible (because it
lowers costs), choose the “right” mix of productive inputs (firms seek out
plentiful, cheap resources), produce valued products (those for which
the sale price exceeds production costs), and seek out the most highly-
valued products (which have the highest prices).
The Invisible Hand lets us down only if market signals somehow become
distorted. For example, left to its own devices, the market has a
tendency to produce too much pollution because disposal into the air
and water is free; the market does not signal the costs of environmental
damage. Alternatively, in the absence of patents, copyrights, and
trademarks there is less incentive to produce new products and
processes. The market provides no means by which innovators may
reap their rewards.
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In these examples, there is a clear presumption that the market would
produce either “too much” (pollution) or “too little” (innovation) in the
absence of specific government policies to address the market’s
failures.  But what failure is at the heart of policies to aid small
businesses?
A corollary to the Invisible Hand theorem is that one must identify
special circumstances in which the profit motive alone is inadequate to
justify using the power of government to favor small businesses. For
example, because firms are cognizant of the relevant costs, the market
leads to efficient decisions about choices of inputs. Tax systems should
generally avoid taxes that distort those choices.  Taxes or other policies4
that distort the production arrangements within firms serve only to
produce inefficiency and thus lower the level of production in the
economy. A straightforward extension of this line of reasoning is that
taxes should not influence the arrangements of firms themselves. To the
extent that profit motives produce a natural size for a firm or a natural
evolution or growth of firms, these efficient tendencies should not be
altered by policies that favor small over large firms. 
Thus, an efficiency-based argument for preferred tax treatment requires
something “special” with regard to small firms or their inputs. Is there
something unique about these enterprises?
Externalities. Externalities refer to situations in which a firm’s
production generates an effect not captured by the costs of production
or the prices charged for its products. The most famous example was
introduced earlier: the externality of pollution, a “product” whose
(negative) value is not incorporated directly into the firm’s decisions. To
“solve” the pollution problem, the standard prescriptions focus on
charging the firm— directly, through taxes, or indirectly, by imposing 
regulations— for the cost of its pollution. In this way the policy “fixes” the
market by incorporating fully all the costs of production into profit
calculations.
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But what if the externality is beneficial? Perhaps a new production
process or innovative product that permits other firms to generate more
or better products? Reversing the logic of the pollution example
suggests that the right policy would be to subsidize the production of
these beneficial externalities, thereby providing incentives to produce
more of the socially desirable activities. Are small firms the primary
source of such beneficial externalities? 
Recent years have witnessed a revival of the notion that there are key
industries or activities that generate externalities beneficial to other
industries and firms. The vigorous public debate over semiconductors,
high-definition television and flat-screen displays is but one example.
Proponents of activist policies argue that products such as these are
essential to develop an economy for the 21st century. Moreover, it is not
enough just to purchase these products from abroad. Instead, domestic
production is necessary to fully reap their benefits because the
knowledge gleaned from their development and production will spill
over into other activities.
Taking the argument further, proponents of small business argue that
they are a unique source of new ideas, new products, and new
technologies. If so, government policy intervention (differential tax
treatment, regulatory relief, anti-trust exemptions, etc.) would be
desirable. Since the private sector is unable to appropriate all of the
gains to these activities, the profit motive alone is inadequate to
stimulate sufficient entrepreneurial innovation.
Recently, however, Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1995) examined the virtues
of subsidies to firms that generate such spillovers. Interestingly, the results
show that the case for a beneficial policy depends both upon the
presence of an externality and the extent to which the recipient
industries have concentrations of monopoly power. Indeed, the
interaction of market forces with the existence of “critical” products may
require that the government choose a complex mix of subsidies and
Metropolitan Studies Program Policy Brief
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taxes for the key products. These are hardly the kind of easily-defensible
policies that proponents of entrepreneurs typically envision.
Moreover, it is an unresolved empirical issue as to whether the small
business in the economy provides a disproportionate share of
innovations and other activities leading to new processes and products.
And, even if small firms and entrepreneurs claim numerical superiority in
these areas, one must further demonstrate that the market is producing
“too few,” i.e., that these activities have external effects not captured
by the firms themselves. While it is intriguing to speculate, recent
research is far from accumulating the weight of evidence sufficient to
establish a government policy of treating preferentially the smaller
businesses in our economy.
Capital Market Imperfections. In the “perfect” world of the Invisible
Hand, firms, projects, and products are evaluated on their merits alone.
Banks and other financial market intermediaries finance those products
with good prospects and turn down the others. However, substantial
recent analyses have demonstrated that credit rationing may prevail as
a “rational” business practice. That is, it may be the case that two
equally promising projects cannot both obtain financing at the same
borrowing rate. Indeed, one of the two projects may not be financed at
all. Worse, the possibility arises that an inferior product or firm will receive
financing at the expense of a superior rival.
For this reason, researchers have focused on the possibility that such
capital market constraints may be a key aspect of the ability to start a
new company. A growing body of literature suggests that capital
market difficulties may impede the entry into entrepreneurship, the initial
capitalization of new ventures, the probability of surviving as a small
business, and the growth rate of revenues for entrepreneurial ventures.5
That is, there exists both a theoretical presumption that financial markets
may need “fixing” and some confirming empirical evidence that
capital market constraints reduce the formation of new businesses and
lower the survival rate among the least established firms.
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Doesn’t this clinch the case for aiding small businesses? No, even these
studies do not establish the proposition that too few businesses are
created each year, or that the “wrong” firms get financed. Nor do they
establish any presumption that too great a fraction of the newly-
founded businesses fail each year. In short, the empirical literature to
date does not provide a solid foundation for a general policy of
systematic intervention on behalf of small business.
In large part, this “go slow” admonition to policy makers stems from the
informational difficulties that lie at the heart of credit market
transactions. Entrepreneurs and businesses know a great deal more
about their abilities and prospects than banks can ever know.
Unfortunately, there is no credible way for them to convey this
information directly to the banks. A poor credit risk has an incentive to
make exactly the same pitch to the bank as a promising venture. There
is no way for the bank to acquire the extra information needed to pick
the best businesses. The government faces exactly the same difficulty
and unless it somehow has an ability greater than the financial sector to
discern the probability of business success, there is little that it can do to
more efficiently allocate credit.  6
This has fairly strong and negative implications for loan programs like
that of the Small Business Administration. While it is true that these
programs provide a subsidy to borrowers— they receive credit they
would not otherwise obtain— it is less clear that society as a whole
benefits. 
Risk-taking. Businesses, large and small, face risks of financial loss and
insolvency. However, the risk of failure is higher for small businesses. Due
to their slender financing and less than fully developed markets, the
failure rate for small firms is higher than that for larger, established
concerns. Does this risk lead to an inadequate formation of new
businesses in risky areas? Should policy offset this risk?
Metropolitan Studies Program Policy Brief
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A particularly prominent example of the interaction of policy and risk
has been arguments in favor of a lower capital gains tax rate. The
Economic Report of the President, 1990 argues (page 115) “Much of the
return to entrepreneurs and their backers who bring new products to
market— particularly through start-up ventures— comes through
increasing the value of the business. Reducing the tax rate on capital
gains will provide a climate that encourages businesses to invest in new
technologies and products.” Sentiments of this sort presumably lay
behind the RRA93 provisions excluding 50 percent of capital gains on
qualifying investments in small businesses.
But the case in favor of preferential treatment of small business capital
gains is far from clear-cut. First, a canon of personal investment strategy
is that one should diversify so that the idiosyncratic risks associated with a
single project or firm have a negligible effect on average earnings.
Diversification may be undertaken directly, through the selection of
individual investments. Alternatively, mutual funds, pension plans and
other indirect means may reap the benefits of diversification. If so, the
risk does not “matter” and there should be no need for a subsidy to
offset the risk. That is, in a sufficiently diversified portfolio, one should not
“count” the firm's specific risks at all. Thus, from this perspective, there
appears to be little need to subsidize financial backers in the form of a
tax cut on capital gains.7
But what of undiversifiable or systemic risks that affect all small
businesses simultaneously? Imagine a bad recession, or shift in trade
policy such as the recent North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
One tempting possibility is that policy should “lean against the wind” of
cyclical movements in the economy. Would not this be beneficial,
especially in light of the frailty of smaller businesses? Regardless of the
merits of the argument, it appears infeasible in practice. The
appropriate policy would necessarily treat small businesses differently
during economic upturns and downturns. Given the demonstrated
inability of the government to use fiscal policy to “fine-tune” the macro
economy, the prospects for timely and appropriate treatment of the
Douglas Holtz-Eakin
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small business sector appear nil.  Of course, the individual owner-
entrepreneur may hold a highly specialized portfolio— the
business— and cannot take advantage of the risk-reduction offered by
diversification. Even so, the case for preferential treatment is far from
clear. Standard economic reasoning does not demonstrate that
increased taxation reduces the willingness of individuals to undertake
risky investments (see, e.g., Sandmo (1987)). This is not surprising; it is
usually quite difficult to establish firm predictions about complex human
endeavors. In the best cases, modern surveys, statistical tools and other
empirical techniques combine to limit the range of possible outcomes.
However, this is not one of those cases, and the relationship between
higher tax rates and the propensity to incur risk remains a contentious
issue.
But what sort of magnitudes are involved? To gain a feel for this,
consider the example presented in Table 1. The entries show the critical
success rate, the probability of success needed to induce an individual
earning $100,000 per year to undertake a risky business start-up. That is,
the table shows the odds of success needed to unleash the individual’s
entrepreneurial tendencies.  Thus, for example, the fifth entry in the first8
row indicates that when 40 percent of capital gains are excluded from
tax the individual must anticipate success 98.7 percent of the time or
better to be induced to start the firm. The row beneath, labeled
“Change,” shows that this represents a 1.3 percentage point reduction
in the critical success rate from that needed with an exclusion of 30
percent of capital gains.
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Excluding capital gains from tax does increase an entrepreneur’s
willingness to invest, expressed as a willingness to accept a lower
likelihood of anticipated success, but the magnitudes are not enormous.
For example, consider the first row that gives the results for a $60,000
investment. A 50 percent capital gains exclusion reduces the critical
success rate from 100 percent to only 97.3 percent, a change in the
critical success rate of only 2.7 percentage points. For lower amounts at
risk, the results are more dramatic. The remaining rows show that for a
smaller, $50,000 investment the reduction in critical success rate
amounts to only 13 percentage points for a 50 percent exclusion. Or, if
the required investment falls to $40,000, the 50 percent exclusion is
equivalent to permitting the critical success rate to be 22.5 percentage
points lower. 
What is the moral? The tax exclusion does reduce the risk facing the
individual, but the effect is not large even for a venture that represents
a very large commitment of annual consumption opportunities. As the
table indicates, the effects on the critical success rate become larger as
the initial outlay declines. But as a matter of public policy the difficulty in
targeting exactly the “right” size of investments for subsidy is daunting.
Subsidies also penalize growth. A final argument against preferential
treatment of small firms rests on the disincentive effects of eliminating
these same preferences as the firm grows. In this way, subsidies to small
firms constitute a “tax” on growth. To the extent that the goal is to
encourage robust business enterprises, a policy of subsidizing the entry
of more firms and then hampering their later development seems
perverse.
Metropolitan Studies Program Policy Brief
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Efficiency and Tax Policy toward Small Firms
Thus far, efficiency-related reasoning does not seem to provide much of
a basis to single out entrepreneurs and small firms for special treatment.
Despite this, tax, regulatory, purchasing and other myriad policies favor
small businesses. In the absence of an efficiency-based justification of
these policies, how should we evaluate their effects? But differently,
what is the harm in such an approach?
Consider the tax provisions that explicitly target small business.  In9
addition to the preferred capital gains tax treatment in RRA93, perhaps
the most significant tax advantage conferred on small businesses is the
ability to “expense,” or deduct, up to $17,500 in capital expenditures per
year.10
What are the consequences? Expensing reduces the cost of capital and
lowers the effective tax rate on the return to small business equity
capital. To get a sense of the magnitudes involved, consider a
manufacturing sector equipment investment. Let the “user-cost of
capital” be defined as the annual pre-tax rate of return needed for an
investment to provide a competitive post-tax return.  To gain some11
intuition, notice that taxing the earnings from the investment raises the
user-cost; the investment yield must be greater in order to pay both the
tax and meet the market's required rate of return. In the opposite
direction, more generous depreciation allowances lower the user-cost;
in effect the tax authority provides “matching funds” in the form of lower
tax liability. In this instance, the key fact is that expensing amounts to
very generous depreciation; the entire investment is deducted in the first
year instead of spread out according to a depreciation schedule.12
Thus, the ability to expense investment provides a reduction in the
required rate of return for small business projects. Is the subsidy
important?
Illustrative computations are shown in Table 2. These figures are based
on the assumption that the financial cost of capital is given by the after-
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Table 2. Illustrative Calculations of User-Cost of Capital (in percent)
Tax Rate Expensing Depreciation Subsidy
15% 17.95 20.23 2.28
25% 17.05 21.13 4.08
35% 16.15 22.40 6.25
tax rate of interest; interest rates are assumed to be 9 percent in the
table.  The rate of inflation is assumed to be 3 percent, while the rate of13
economic depreciation is set equal to 13.3 percent.  14
The first row of the table shows the results of using a 15 percent tax rate
(the lowest corporation income tax rate) on the return to capital.
Column (1) indicates that the required user-cost is 17.95 percent when it
is possible to expense the investment in question. In column (2),
however, one finds that the same investment requires a user-cost of
20.23 percent when granted typical tax depreciation.  Thus, the option15
to expense the investment provides an effective subsidy to the required
rate of return equal to 2.28 percentage points.
The remainder of the rows show analogous computations using the
remaining rates in the corporation income tax schedules, rates of 25
percent and 35 percent, respectively.  In each case, providing16
immediate write-offs to small business constitutes a substantial subsidy.
For a 25 percent tax rate, the hurdle rate of return falls by roughly 4
percentage points, while at the highest tax rate the hurdle rate would
be 6 percentage points lower.  (Of course, to the extent that17
investment exceeds the $17,500 threshold, the marginal investment is
not expensed and the subsidy to new investment disappears.)
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Table 2 also embodies the final feature of the tax code directed toward
small business. Both small business taxed through the individual income
tax (in the form of sole-proprietorships, partnerships, or S-corporations)
and those small C-corporations taxed under the corporation income tax
face a series of increasing marginal tax rates. In this limited sense, small
businesses are ostensibly tax-favored by the lower rates early in the tax
schedules.
A glance down the columns of Table 2, however, indicates that the
effective subsidy hardly coincides with the reductions in statutory rates.
Because the value of interest deductibility and expensing declines as
the tax rate is lowered, the user-cost of capital rises. For example,
moving from a 15 percent to a 25 percent tax rate lowers the user cost
from 17.95 percent to 17.05 percent. A further increase in the tax rate to
34 percent lowers the user cost again, this time to 16.24 percent. In
contrast, the lower value of depreciation allowances for larger
businesses (column (2)) results in a steady increase in the user cost as the
tax rate rises. 
The table dramatically displays the social impact of these targeted
policies: small-firm investments have a lower pre-tax return than other
business investments; they are attractive solely due to the tax
preferences. Unless these firms have a social virtue not captured by the
profitability of their projects, every dollar of tax-driven small-firm
investment carries with it the sacrifice of another, higher-return, business
expansion that was not financed. In short, it is far from costless to
subsidize one business form over another.
Fairness
Public policies are typically judged in part by their “fairness.” For
example, an income tax is horizontally equitable if those with the same
income pay the same amount of tax. In the same fashion, vertical
equity requires that those with a greater income should pay a greater
amount of tax.
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But how should we think about fairness and public policy toward
entrepreneurs and small businesses? For example, should not small firms
get a break? The difficulty is that while appeals to equity carry
considerable force with regard to individuals, they are less compelling
for firms. An adage as old as the field of public finance is that “firms
don't pay taxes, people do.” More generally, “firms” don’t benefit (or
suffer) from public policy. In the end, the impacts are transmitted to
people— workers, managers, financiers and owners.
Worse, applying notions of fairness to firms may lead to inconsistencies in
the treatment of individuals. A dramatic example is the recently
enacted preferential treatment of small business-related capital gains.
This small business policy follows on the heels of a protracted dispute
during the Bush administration over the desirability of providing a
reduction in the capital gains tax rate. In large part, this debate
featured an emphasis on the distributional aspects of capital gains tax
reductions. (See Auten and Cordes (1991) for a summary of the issues.) It
is not useful here to take a stand on the larger issue of the desirability of
reducing taxes on capital gains. However, regardless of one’s views, it is
straightforward to note that the implications of providing preferred
treatment to small businesses investments are the same as providing
reduced rates in general. Capital gains accrue to savers, the suppliers
of capital in the economy. These suppliers occupy a particular stratum
in the income distribution (they are typically well-off). From the
perspective of fairness, the source of the capital gain per se is of no
consequence. If fairness demands that capital gains be taxed, small
business gains should be taxed as well. Alternatively, if fairness requires
that capital gains be in whole or part excluded from tax, then the
exclusion should apply to all gains. Fairness applies to people, not firms.
Conclusion
There seems to be widespread support for special help to small
businesses which is manifested in preferential tax treatment of these
Metropolitan Studies Program Policy Brief
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enterprises. However, consideration of the standard efficiency and
equity criteria for such a subsidy provides little support for such policies.
Entrepreneurs do struggle. New ventures scramble for financing. Small
businesses frequently merge and nearly as frequently fail. But in issues of
public policy, “zero” is rarely the right answer. Policy should not aspire to
zero struggle, no scrambling and no failure. In the end there is a “right”
amount of business failure. Is the current rate too high, or even too low?
We do not know enough to answer this fundamental question, much
less to determine which firms to target for success or failure.
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1. Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Entrepreneurship and Special Problems Facing Small
Business of the Committee on Small Business, United
States Senate, S. Hrg. 99-677, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1986.
2. Internal Revenue Code, Section 1202 describes the
qualified small business stock to which this tax
preference applies. See DeLap and Brandt [1994].
3. See Plesko (forthcoming) for a discussion of the rules
associated with S-corporations.
4. See Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).
5. See, for example, Evans and Leighton, (1989), Evans
and Jovanovic (1989), or Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and
Rosen (1994a, 1994b).
6. This reasoning does not apply to credit market
discrimination (or the spillover of product market
discrimination into credit markets); see, e.g., Bates
(1991). In these instances there is a direct rationale
for government intervention.
7. Poterba (1989) indicates that a large fraction of
venture capital is supplied by tax- exempt entities
such as pension funds, making the likely impact of
preferential treatment much smaller than even the
analysis of individual behavior would suggest.
8. Details of the computations are available from the
author.
Notes
c
q 1
(1 z)
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9. I focus here on explicit preferential treatment of
small businesses. A broader definition might include
as well the fact that small businesses are less likely to
be corporate entities, and thus do not pay the
corporation tax, or that the mix of debt and equity
may yield a lower effective tax rate on small
businesses.
10. The limit increased from a limit of $10,000 in 1993.
Section 179 expensing provisions are limited by
taxable income in any year and are phased out by
the amount of qualified investment in excess of
$200,000.
11. Specifically, following Hall and Jorgenson (1967), the
user-cost of capital in the presence of the tax code
is given by
where c is the annual value of production from the
investment, q is the purchase price of capital
equipment,  is the after-tax financial cost of
capital,  is the rate of inflation,  is the rate of
geometric depreciation,  is the tax rate, and z is the
present value of depreciation allowances provided
for a dollar of investment.
12. Recent tax reform proposals center around the
move to consumption tax base in which the return
to saving and investment are not taxed. In practice,
these schemes typically permit expensing. Notice
that with expensing, z=1 and the user-cost in note 10
is no longer affected by the tax rate, . Thus,
consumption-tax reforms are neutral with respect to
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firm size.
13. The current prime rate of interest is 9 percent.
14. Taken from Hulten and Wykoff (1981), p. 94.
15. In column (2), z=0.2814, the 1988 value taken from
Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard [1994], Table 1,
page 8. Increasing the value of z modestly to
account for the slightly lower inflation in recent years
has little effect on the results.
16. The use of these rates ignores the 5 percent
surcharge on corporate revenues between $100,000
and $335,000. In this range, the marginal tax rate is
40 percent.
17. In addition, the 1991 Statistics of Income,
Corporation Income Tax Returns indicates that the
ratio of net depreciable assets to business sales is 50
percent lower (0.128 versus 0.256) for firms with
under $100,000 of assets than for all firms. The lower
capital intensity of these firms implies that the
effective output subsidy is smaller than that
suggested by the cost of capital computations
alone. I thank Eric Toder for emphasizing this feature.
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